The Creation of Legal Principle by Du Plessis, Paul
Roman Legal Tradition, 4 (2008), 46–69.  ISSN 1943-6483.  Published by the Ames Foun–
dation and the University of Glasgow School of Law.  This work may be reproduced and 
distributed for all non-commercial purposes.  Copyright © 2008 by P. J. du Plessis.  All rights 
reserved apart from those granted above.  ROMANLEGALTRADITION.ORG 
The Creation of Legal Principle 
P. J. du Plessis
∗ 
Abstract – This article examines the process whereby legal 
principle was created in the formative period of the ius commune 
(1100–1400).  It uses a speciﬁc example from the realm of the law 
of letting and hiring to argue that distinct phases can be iden-
tiﬁed in this process.  An appreciation of the existence of these 
phases, in turn, casts new light on the variety of specialized cog-
nitive techniques employed by medieval jurists to transform 
Roman legal rules into the “common law” of Europe. 
 
1.  Introduction 
Civil law systems historically inﬂuenced by Roman law through 
the process known as “reception” are essentially made up of 
general principles (regula) distilled through centuries from a com-
mon historical source and modiﬁed over time to suit the needs of a 
speciﬁc jurisdiction.1  While much has been written about the 
external history of the ius commune, the process whereby these 
general principles were created remains largely unexplored.2  This 
                                                                                               
∗  Lecturer, University of Edinburgh School of Law.  English transla-
tions from the Digest taken from A. Watson, ed., The Digest of Justinian, 
2nd ed. (Philadelphia 1998).  English translation from the Institutes of 
Justinian taken from P. Birks and G. McLeod, ed., Justinian’s Institutes 
(London 1987).  English translation of texts from the Code of Justinian are 
my own, but are inﬂuenced by the translations of S. P. Scott, and those of 
F. H. Blume, ed., Annotated Justinian Code, rev. T. Kearley, recently 
published on the website of the University of Wyoming College of Law.  All 
translations of medieval sources are my own. 
1  On the phenomenon of reception, see generally P. Vinogradoff, Ro-
man Law in Medieval Europe (London 1909); P. Koschaker, Europa und 
das römische Recht (Munich 1947); F. Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 
der Neuzeit: unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschen Entwick-
lung, 2nd ed. (Göttingen 1967); M. Bellomo, The Common Legal Past of 
Europe 1000–1800, trans. L. Cochrane (Washington D.C. 1995); and P. 
Stein, Roman Law in European History (Cambridge 1999). 
2  Some work has been done on possible methods of enquiry, see 
E. J. H. Schrage, Utrumque Ius: eine Einführung in das Studium der Que-2008  The Creation of Legal Principle  47
 
article will shed light on this process by focusing on the develop-
ment of a single legal principle from an area of private law which 
still resonates in modern law.  This principle, the hereditability of 
letting and hiring, is similar in all civil law systems whether 
purely civilian or mixed.  Thus, for example, in French law death 
of one of the parties does not terminate the contract.3  A similar 
principle exists in mixed legal systems such as Scots law,4 the 
civil code of Louisiana5 and South African law.6  The reason for 
the similarity of these provisions may be attributed largely to the 
common historical source (Roman law) underlying these legal 
systems, but the process whereby this principle was received 
during the development of these systems undoubtedly also played 
a major role. 
  In order to demonstrate how the notion of the hereditability 
of letting and hiring became rooted in modern civilian systems, 
                                                                                               
llen des mittelalterlichen gelehrten Rechts (Berlin 1992); H. Lange, Röm-
isches Recht im Mittelalter, 1 (Munich 1997). 
3  Code Civil, art. 1742: “Le contrat de louage n’est point résolu par 
la mort du baillieur ni par celle du preneur.”  See art. 1751 about the 
death of co-lessees. 
4 A.  McAllister,  Scottish Law of Leases, 3rd ed. (East Kilbride 2002), 
§ 8.1.  In Scots law, the issue of the hereditability of a lease is regulated by 
The Succession (Scotland) Act of 1964, which replaced the common law 
principle.  Where a tenant dies during the course of the term of lease, the 
lease vests in the executor who has to dispose of it lawfully.  Whether the 
lease will transfer to the heirs depends on whether the tenant made a 
bequest to that effect.  Where the tenant has not made such a bequest, the 
matter becomes more complicated.  There are special statutory rules about 
the hereditability of certain types of leases. 
5  Art. 2731 of the Louisiana Civil Code: “A contract for letting out is 
not dissolved by the death of the lessor, nor by that of the lessee; their 
respective heirs are bound by the contract” (replaced by art. 2717 in 2004.  
The wording of the new article has not changed substantially, but also 
now includes juristic persons.).  See V. Palmer, Leases: The Law in 
Louisiana (Norcross 1982), §§ 5–22.  The historical inspiration for this 
rule seems to be Pothier’s Traité du contrat de louage § 317 (English: 
Pothier’s Treatise on the Contract of Letting and Hiring, trans. G. A. 
Mulligan (Durban 1953)). 
6  South African law, being uncodiﬁed, relies on Roman-Dutch 
authority for this rule, among these Hugo Grotius, Inleidinge tot de 
Hollandsche rechts-geleerdheid, 2nd ed. F. Dovring, H. F. W. D. Fischer 
and E. M. Meijers (Leiden 1965), bk. 3, tit. 19, §§ 9, 16; Simon van Leeu-
wen, Censura Forensis (Leiden 1678), bk. 1, tit. 4, § 22.18; Het Roomsch 
Hollandsch Recht, bk. 4, tit. 21, § 6 (English: Simon van Leeuwen, Com-
mentaries on Roman-Dutch Law, trans. J. G. Kotzé, 2nd ed. rev. C. W. 
Decker (London 1921–1923)); Johannes Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas 
(Leiden 1698–1704), bk. 19, tit. 2, § 1.14.  See W. E. Cooper, Landlord and 
Tenant, 2nd ed. (Cape Town 1994), 325–26, especially note 93. 48  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 4
 
this article will focus on two formative periods in the history of 
the ius commune.  First, the historical foundations underlying the 
principle of the hereditability of the contract of letting and hiring 
in Roman law will be investigated.  This will be done primarily to 
demonstrate the state of the legal principle in Roman law and to 
identify the texts subsequently used by medieval jurists to con-
struct their own interpretations.  The second part of this article 
will focus on the transformation of the Roman law rule into a 
general legal principle during the foundational period of the ius 
commune, that is the period 1100–1400 when the intellectual 
study of law resurfaced as an academic discipline at Italian and 
French universities and when the intellectual endeavours of these 
jurists led to the creation of a pan-European body of law consist-
ing of Roman, customary, canon and feudal law.7  While it would 
be possible to trace the history of this general principle in subse-
quent periods of the ius commune, this article will focus on medie-
val interpretations as these proved particularly inﬂuential in the 
creation of a general principle. 
2.  Historical foundations 
There are seven Roman law texts in which the issue of the 
hereditability of this contract is discussed.8  In most of these, 
hereditability is not at the forefront of the discussion, but is men-
tioned as the background to a speciﬁc casus.  The texts may be 
grouped into two categories, namely those dealing with the death 
of the conductor and those with the death of the locator.  In each 
case, the texts have been arranged chronologically. 
Death of the conductor: 
1. D.19.2.15.9,  Ulpianus libro trigesimo secundo ad edictum.  
Interdum ad hoc ex locato agetur, ut quis locatione liberetur, 
Iulianus libro quinto decimo digestorum scripsit.  Ut puta 
Titio fundum locavi isque pupillo herede instituto decessit et, 
cum tutor constituisset abstinere pupillum hereditate, ego 
                                                                                               
7  Stein (note 1), ch. 4.  On the sources of this period, see H. Coing, 
ed.,  Mittelalter, 1100–1500: die gelehreten Rechte und die Gesetzgebung 
[Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren europäischen Privat-
rechtsgeschichte, 1] (Munich 1973).  See also Schrage (note 2); Lange (note 
2). 
8  See P. J. du Plessis, “The Hereditability of Locatio Conductio,” in 
J. W. Cairns and P. J. du Plessis, ed., Beyond Dogmatics: Law and Society 
in the Roman World (Edinburgh 2007), 139–53, for a full discussion of the 
position in Roman law. 2008  The Creation of Legal Principle  49
 
fundum pluris locavi: deinde pupillus restitutus est in bona 
paterna.  Ex conducto nihil amplius eum consecuturum, 
quam ut locatione liberetur: mihi enim iusta causa fuit 
elocandi. 
Sometimes a man will have an action on hire to discharge 
from a lease, as Julian wrote in the ﬁfteenth book of his Di-
gest.  For instance, I leased a farm to Titius and he then died 
leaving a pupillus as an heir; the tutor arranged that the pu-
pillus refuse the inheritance and I then leased the farm for 
more money.  Later the pupillus won a restitutio to his fa-
ther’s property.  [Julian held that] he will obtain nothing in 
an action on hire except that he be discharged from the lease; 
for I had a legally acceptable reason for leasing, . . . .9 
2. D.19.2.19.8, Ulpianus libro trigesimo secundo ad edictum.  Ex 
conducto actionem etiam ad heredem transire palam est. 
It is obvious that an action on hire also passes to the [lessee’s] 
heir. 
3. C.4.65.10,  Imp. Gordianus A Pomponio Sabino.  Viam 
veritatis ignoras in conductionibus non succedere heredes 
conductoris existimans, cum, sive perpetua conductio est, 
etiam ad heredes transmittatur, sive temporalis, intra tem-
pora locationis heredi quoque onus contractus incumbat.   
239 CE. 
He who reckons that a lease does not transmit to the heirs of 
the tenant ignores the way of truth.  Irrespective of whether 
the lease is temporary or perpetual it will transmit to the 
heirs and for the remaining period of the lease the heir will 
also be burdened by the contract. 
4. C.4.65.24,  Impp. Diocletianus et Maximianus A A Aurelio 
Antonino.  Contractus locationis conductionisque non inter-
venientibus etiam instrumentis ratus habeatur: secundum 
quod heredes conductoris, etsi non intervenerit instrumenta, 
non uxorem convenire debes.  Sane de posteriore tempore, 
quo conductricem ipsam proponis fuisse, adesse ﬁdem 
precibus tuis probans pensionem integras ab ea pete.  293 CE. 
A contract of letting and hiring, even though not reduced to 
writing, shall have effect.  Accordingly, you should sue the 
                                                                                               
9  The text appears to have been edited without ﬁnishing the ﬁnal 
sentence.  The possible options are explored in the subsequent texts. 50  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 4
 
heirs of the tenant, rather than his wife even though the con-
tract has not been reduced to writing.  Clearly, for the subse-
quent period which you allege the woman has been your les-
see, having proved the statements in your petition, notify her 
to pay the rent in full. 
5. J.3.24.6.  Mortuo conductore intra tempora conductionis heres 
eius eodem iure in conductionem succedit. 
If someone who has something on hire dies before the period 
of hire expires, his heir steps into his shoes with the same 
rights. 
Death of the locator: 
6. D.19.2.24.5, Paulus libro trigesimo quarto ad edictum.  Qui in 
plures annos fundum locaverat, testamento suo damnavit 
heredem, ut conductorem liberaret.  Si non patiatur heres 
eum reliquo tempore frui, est ex conducto actio: quod si 
patiatur nec mercedes remittat, ex testamento tenetur. 
A man leased out a farm for many years, and then in his will 
he condemned the heir to discharge the lessee [from paying 
rent].  If the heir does not allow him enjoyment for the re-
mainder of the term, an action on hire lies; but if he should 
allow this without remitting the rent, he is liable on the will. 
7. D.19.2.9.1, Ulpianus libro trigesimo secundo ad edictum.  Hic 
subiungi potest, quod Marcellus libro sexto digestorum 
scripsit: si fructuarius locaverit fundum in quinquennium et 
decesserit, heredem eius non teneri, ut frui praestet, non 
magis quam insula exusta teneretur locator conductori.  Sed 
an ex locato teneatur conductor, ut pro rata temporis quo 
fruitus est pensionem praestet, Marcellus quaerit, quem-
admodum praestaret, si fructuarii servi operas conduxisset 
vel habitationem?  Et magis admittit teneri eum: et est 
aequissimum.  Idem quaerit, si sumptus fecit in fundum 
quasi quinquennio fruiturus, an recipiat?  Et ait non recep-
turum, quia hoc evenier posse prospicere debuit.  Quid tamen 
si non quasi fructuarius ei locavit, se si quasi fundi dominus?  
Videlicet tenebitur: decepit enim conductorem: et ita imper-
ator Antoninus cum divo Severo rescripsit.  In exustis quoque 
aedibus eius temporis, quod aediﬁcium stetit, mercedem 
praestandum rescripserunt. 
Here can be appended what Marcellus wrote in the sixth book 
of his Digest: “If a fructuary leases out a farm for ﬁve years 2008  The Creation of Legal Principle  51
 
and then dies [before the term is over], his heir is not liable 
for providing the [tenant’s] enjoyment, no more than the les-
sor is liable to the lessee when the apartment house burns 
down.”  But Marcellus asks if the lessee is liable on lease for 
providing rental payment prorated to his [actual] time of en-
joyment, just as he would owe had he hired the services of a 
slave held in usufruct or a dwelling.  He prefers to allow 
liability, and this is the fairest position.  He then asks 
whether he may recover outlay on the farm under the as-
sumption that he would enjoy it for ﬁve years.  He says that 
he may not recover this, since he should have foreseen the 
possible outcome.  However, what if he [the fructuary] leased 
it to him while posing not as a fructuary, but as the farm’s 
owner?  Obviously he is liable, since he deceived the lessee; 
and so the Emperor Antoninus together with the deiﬁed 
Severus replied in a rescript.  Likewise in the case of a 
building destroyed by ﬁre they replied that rent was due for 
the time when the building stood. 
Two initial conclusions may be drawn from a survey of these 
texts.  First, of the seven texts listed above, four are concerned 
with one form of letting and hiring (locatio conductio rei).  Apart 
from the remaining general statements, there are no texts sug-
gesting that this principle applied to the remaining two forms of 
letting and hiring (locatio conductio operis and operarum).  This 
has led some to conclude that not all forms of letting and hiring 
were heritable.10  Secondly, the texts provide no information 
about the origin of the notion of the hereditability of letting and 
hiring.  The dating of the texts may provide some evidence.  The 
texts range in date from the second century CE to the sixth cen-
tury CE, but this merely indicates that the matter of the heredit-
ability of letting and hiring was the subject of juristic discussion 
during this period.  It may well be that it was already established 
law before the second century BCE, since non-legal sources show 
that the issue of the hereditability of the contract of letting and 
hiring was already discussed in the ﬁrst century BCE.11  Given the 
fact that the consensual contract of letting and hiring is generally 
presumed to have arisen in the second half of the second century 
BCE (if not before), this suggests that the hereditability of letting 
and hiring either formed part of the contract from its creation or 
                                                                                               
10  See the authorities cited in Du Plessis (note 8), 140–41. 
11  Du Plessis (note 8), 141–43 (citing Cic. Verr. 2.1.51.130–150 and 
Cic. Att. 13.45.2–3, 13.46.3, 13.37.4). 52  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 4
 
that it was introduced somewhere between this terminus and the 
ﬁrst century BCE.12 
  It is furthermore evident that although the drafters of the 
Corpus Iuris Civilis claimed to have eliminated the background 
information surrounding most of the text fragments, the majority 
of these can at best be described as casuistic, i.e. dealing with a 
speciﬁc situation, and leaving it to the individual to extrapolate 
the principle behind it.13  Looking at the matter from the perspec-
tive of legal doctrine, three general statements may be derived 
from these texts.  First, both the actions arising from the contract 
of letting and hiring were available to the heirs of the respective 
parties where either the locator or conductor died during the 
course of the term of the contract.  In second place, this principle 
seemingly applied both to letting and hiring for a ﬁxed term and 
those regarded as being perpetual.  Finally, the legal position of 
the locator could affect the hereditability of the letting and hiring.  
Where the locator was a usufructuary (i.e. the beneﬁciary of the 
personal servitude known as usufruct) who let out the object with 
a view to drawing civil fruits by way of rental income, his death 
terminated the contract as usufruct is a personal servitude which 
was attached to a speciﬁc person. 
3.  The creation of a general principle 
A number of medieval texts dealing with the issue of the 
hereditability of letting and hiring will be discussed in this sec-
tion.  They are, in chronological order, the Summa Trecensis, Lo 
Codi, the Summa Codicis of Placentinus, the Summa of Goffredus 
de Trano, both the Lectura and the Summa of Azo on the Code, 
Odofredus’  Lectura on the Code, Accursius’ Gloss on the Code, 
Jacques de Revigny’s Lectura on the Code, Henricus Hostiensis’ 
Summa, Cynus de Pistoia’s Lectura on the Code, Albericus de 
Rosate’s Commentary on the Code, and Baldus de Ubaldis’ Com-
mentary on the Code.  The grounds on which these have been 
selected are threefold.14  First, of the extant medieval juristic 
                                                                                               
12  See A. Watson, The Contract of Mandate in Roman Law (Oxford 
1961), 9–10.  See also A. Watson, The Law of Obligations in the Later 
Roman Republic (Oxford 1965), 100–101. 
13  The instruction to remove all ancillary context from the texts is 
stated in the C. Deo auctore 7. 
14  The only major drawback of this methodology is that manuscripts 
have not been taken into account.  While these are an important source of 
information about the development of the ius commune, they are pre-
dominantly used to make larger claims about “lines of inﬂuence” from 2008  The Creation of Legal Principle  53
 
writing, the works selected here discuss the contract of letting and 
hiring most comprehensively.  Secondly, they provide a sample of 
the different “schools” of jurists (Glossators, Ultramontani, Can-
onists, and Commentators) which contributed to the creation of 
the  ius commune.  Finally, these works also present a cross-
section of the different types of juristic literature such as summae 
(summaries of a speciﬁc component of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, 
most commonly the Code), lecturae (lecture notes reﬂecting the 
teaching of Roman law at medieval universities) and commentaria 
(learned commentaries on speciﬁc topics within the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis).15 
  There are three discernible phases in the development of this 
general principle.  Phase one (roughly covering the twelfth cen-
tury) consists of introductory discussions.  Phase two (covering 
the thirteenth century) contains complex discussions focusing on 
the interaction between the principle of the hereditability of 
letting and hiring and other rules/areas of law.  This phase also 
witnesses the creation of a general principle based on Roman (and 
other) foundations.  The ﬁnal phase (covering the latter part of 
the thirteenth century and continuing until the end of the four-
teenth century) focuses on the application of the principle in 
practice.  It will be apparent throughout that, even though differ-
ent forms of literature are discussed in this section, they all 
demonstrate a remarkable knowledge of Roman law. 
a.  Phase one 
One of the earliest indications that the issue of the hereditability 
of the contract of letting and hiring formed part of medieval legal 
thought is a statement in the Summa Trecensis, a work thought 
to include the views of a number of medieval jurists produced 
between c. 1135–1140.16 
[§§ 3–4]  H[a]ec actio locatori heredive eius competit in eum 
qui conduxit vel heredem eius: et hoc, sive perpetua sive 
temporalis fuit.  Veniunt autem in hac actione qu[a]edam ex 
natura contractus, qu[a]edam iure actionis. . . .  [§ 6]  Ex 
conducto actio conductori heredive eius competit in locatorem 
                                                                                               
teacher to pupil.  Since this article does not make any such claims, only 
printed sources have been consulted. 
15  On these forms of literature, see Schrage (note 2), 35. 
16  An alternative view is that it was produced c. 1140–1159 in Bolo-
gna.  On the Summa Trecensis and the debate over its authorship, see 
Coing (note 7), 198–99, as well as Lange (note 2), § 45. 54  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 4
 
eiusve heredem.  In qua similiter spectandum est, quid ex 
natura contractus seu actionis prestandum sit.17 
This action is available to the locator or his heir against him 
who rented [it] or his heir whether the contract is for a lim-
ited period of time or perpetual.  For in this action some [ele-
ments] from the nature of the contract and some from the na-
ture of the action unite. . . .  The actio ex conducto is available 
to the conductor or his heir against the locator or his heir.  
Similarly, in this action it ought to be investigated what has 
to be performed in terms of the nature of the contract or the 
action. 
Though this appears to be nothing more than a standard sum-
mary of the Roman law position, this text is signiﬁcant for at least 
two reasons.  First, the hereditability of letting and hiring is 
explained in terms of actions (a sophisticated concept) and it is 
clear that the unnamed authors were familiar with C.4.65.10 
given the use of the phrase sive perpetua sive temporalis.  This is 
to be expected since the Summa was essentially a summary of 
Books 1–9 of the Justinianic Code.18  Secondly, the statement 
about the varying elements of the action suggests a thorough 
understanding of the contract of letting and hiring, even though 
all aspects of the legal principle were not explored.  Thus, for 
example, the implications of the principle were not examined nor 
were the boundaries contemplated. 
  The hereditability of letting and hiring is also treated in the 
Provençal treatise, Lo Codi, produced in southern France around 
1170 at the latest, seemingly for use by lay judges who did not 
have a detailed knowledge of the law.19 
§ 15 Istas petic[t]iones quas habent ille qui locavit et ille qui 
conduxit possunt habere heredes eorum usque ad xxx 
annos.20 
                                                                                               
17 Hermann  Fitting,  Summa Codicis des Irnerius mit einer Einleit-
ung (Berlin 1894; repr. 1971), bk. 4, tit. 57, §§ 3–4, 6.  Errors in typogra-
phy silently corrected. 
18  On the content of the Summa as a form of juristic literature in me-
dieval learned law, see Lange (note 2), § 45.III.1. 
19  On the target audience of Lo Codi, see Coing (note 7), 200–201, as 
well as Lange (note 2), § 49. 
20  Hermann Fitting, ed., Lo Codi in der lateinischen Übersetzung des 
Richardus Pisanus (Halle 1906), bk. 4, tit. 69 in ﬁne.  The Latin transla-
tion of this work, produced in 1176 by Richard of Pisa, has been used 2008  The Creation of Legal Principle  55
 
The heirs can have these actions which are available to the 
lessor and lessee for a period of thirty years. 
Like the authors of the Summa Trecensis, the drafter of this 
treatise was primarily concerned with the transmissibility of 
actions.  Thus, the text states that both actions are available to 
the respective heirs for a period of thirty years.  The origin and 
meaning of this time period is unclear.  Roman-law texts indicate 
that the actions were generally only available to the heirs of the 
deceased parties for the remainder of the original term of letting 
and hiring.21  Two explanations may be offered for the inclusion of 
this time period in the text.  First, it could represent an example 
of local custom which had been incorporated into the text of this 
work, since it is known to have been drafted for use by lay-judges.  
Secondly, it may well be that the thirty-year period was linked to 
the notion that some actions in Roman law were perpetual.   
Actions were regarded as perpetual when they endured for thirty 
years.22  A general feature of such perpetual actions is that they 
transmitted to the heirs of the parties.  Unfortunately, the drafter 
of this treatise did not list the sources used to compile this state-
ment nor is it clear from the context whether the notion of a 
perpetual action was at the basis of the author’s argument.  If this 
is the case, however, it would suggest an early attempt to synthe-
sise Roman law with elements from other areas of law to enhance 
understanding. 
  This view on the transmissibility of the actions arising from 
the contract of letting and hiring to the heirs of the parties seems 
to have appeared in juristic discussions until the end of the 
twelfth century as is evident from the Summa Codicis of Pla-
centinus (ﬂ. until 1192) compiled c. 1165.23  
Locati autem competit locatori, & eius heredi, contra 
conductorem & eius heredem.24 
[The  actio]  locati is available to the locator and his heir, 
against the conductor and his heir. 
                                                                                               
instead of the original Provençal as it has been standardized and edited.  
Errors in typography silently corrected. 
21  Compare C.4.65.10 above. 
22  C.7.39.3.2 = C.Th. 4.14.1.3 = Brev. (Lex Rom. Visigoth.) 4.12.1.3.  
23  Coing (note 7), 201–202.  See also Lange (note 2), § 23. 
24  Placentini Summa Codicis, ed. F. Calasso (Turin 1962) (anastatic 
reprint of the 1536 Mainz edition), bk. IV, tit. 64 (De locato et conducto), 
190 in ﬁne. 56  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 4
 
Actio conducti competit conductori, & eius heredi, in locator-
em & eius heredem.25 
The actio conducti is available to the conductor and his heir 
against the locator and his heir. 
b.  Phase two 
Since different strands of legal thought (Roman, canon, and 
feudal) contributed to the formation of the medieval ius commune, 
it is important to establish whether other academic views on the 
subject existed during this time, since they may have affected the 
formation of the principle.  As far as canon law is concerned, 
Goffredus de Trano (ﬂ. until 1245), who studied in Bologna and 
who was the teacher of prominent medieval jurists such as Azo 
and Accursius, followed the civilian view on the matter. 
§ 6 Et si moriatur conductor infra tempus conductionis, 
succedit haeres in iure conductionis, secus in usufructu, qui 
personalis est, & extinguitur cum persona, ut [C.eod.tit.l.si 
unam26], & C.3.33.1027. 28 
And if the conductor should die during the period of the con-
tract, the heir inherits the right in tenancy.  This situation is 
different in [the case of] usufruct, which is personal and is ex-
tinguished with the person, as in [spurious reference], & 
C.3.33.10. 
                                                                                               
25  Placentinus (note 24), 191 in medio. 
26 This reference could not be resolved.  There is no l.si unam in 
C.4.65, the Codex title on letting and hiring, nor does such a title exist in 
C.3.33, the Codex title on usufruct mentioned in the text. 
27 C.3.33.10: 
The Emperors Diocletian and Maximian to Pomponius.  If the (fe-
male) owner of the property leased the usufruct of the same to your 
wife, subject to the payment of a certain sum every year, the causa of 
the use and enjoyment should not be denied to her (the owner), even 
after the death of the (female) tenant.  293 CE. 
The  ﬁn a l  s e n t e n c e  o f  t h i s  t e x t  i s  p a r t icularly problematic “.  .  . morte 
conductricis ei quae locavit etiam utendi fruendi causa non est dene-
ganda.”  Fred Blume has interpreted this phrase to mean (in a rather 
roundabout way) that death of the usufructuary terminates the lease, 
while death of the owner does not.  In support of this view he cited 
C.3.33.3 and 12.  As far as could be ascertained, this text has never been 
suspected of interpolation. 
28  Goffredus de Trano, Summa in titulos decretalium (Padua 1667), 
229–30. 2008  The Creation of Legal Principle  57
 
Goffredus not only acknowledged that the heir succeeds to the 
rights in tenancy, but also contrasted the position to the personal 
servitude, usufruct, which though similar to letting and hiring, 
could not transfer to the heirs.  This indicates that the issue of the 
hereditability of letting and hiring was no longer merely discussed 
in terms of the transmissibility of actions, but that the boundaries 
of the concept were being tested by comparing it to similar areas 
of law. 
  As for civilian scholarship, the jurist Azo (ﬂ. until 1220/1230) 
in his lectures on the Code of Justinian examined C.4.65.10 in 
detail.29  
[Viam veritatis]: Intellige de veritate de qua hic loquitur.   
Alias enim Deus dicitur via, veritas, & vita.  Assignatur con-
tra supra [C.3.33.1030] solve ut ibi.  Heredi quoque onus 
contractus incumbat.  Licet & de eo in locatione non sit facta 
mentio: quia plerumque tam heredibus nostris quam nobis-
met ipsis cavemus: ut [D.22.3.931].  Si tamen ita ﬁat locatio ut 
inhabites quamdiu mihi placebit, morte locatoris ﬁnitur: ut 
[D.19.2.432].33 
It should be understood [to refer to] the truth which is dis-
cussed here.  For it is different where God states [I am] the 
way, the truth and the light.  It is assigned a contradictory 
[text] above [C.3.33.10] and let it be resolved as [demon-
strated] there.  “The burden of the contract also lies upon the 
heir.”  It is permitted/lawful and it is not mentioned in the 
contract, since generally we provide for our heirs as well as 
for ourselves, as in [D.22.3.9].  If, however, the agreement is 
                                                                                               
29  For more information about the life of this jurist, see Coing (note 
7), 180, and Lange (note 2), § 30, and the extensive literature cited there. 
30  As in note 28. 
31 D.22.3.9,  Celsus,  Digest, book 1: 
If there is a pact in which the heir is not mentioned, the question is 
put whether it applies only to the original party.  Although one who 
raises a defense must indeed prove it, the plaintiff must show that 
the agreement applied only to the other party and not to his heir, 
since we generally provide for our heirs as well as ourselves. 
32 D.19.2.4, Pomponius, Sabinus, book 16: “A contract of ‘lease or 
grant on precarium,’ if concluded for as long as the object’s lessor or 
grantor may desire, is dissolved when the lessor dies.” 
33 Azo,  Lectura super Codicem, in M. Viora, ed., Corpus Glossatorum 
Iuris Civilis, 3 (Turin 1966) (anastatic reprint of a Paris 1577 edition), on 
C.4.65.10.  This work was produced from a manuscript created by an 
otherwise unknown student of Azo, Alexander de Sancto Egidio. 58  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 4
 
such that you inhabit as long as it pleases me, it is termi-
nated by the death of the lessor, as in [D.19.2.4]. 
Item morte locatoris non extinguitur locatio nisi ego loca-
verim tibi quod ad vellem ﬁnitur locatio morte mea ut 
[D.19.2.434].  In rebus immo ecclesiasticis forte ﬁet locatio 
usque ad xxx annos cum dicat lex an ﬁeri in perpetuum . . . .  
A vasallis atque propter consuetudinem regni sit usque ad xx 
annos et dicit libellus. . . .35 
Similarly the letting and hiring is not terminated by the 
death of the locator, unless I let it out to you [with the pro-
viso] that I wish it to be ended through my death [D.19.2.4].  
More correctly, in ecclesiastical objects the letting and hiring 
will per chance continue for thirty years, since the lex states 
“an ﬁeri in perpetuum” . . . .  But for vassals according to the 
custom of the kingdom let it be for twenty years and the 
booklet states thus. . . . 
Sunt autem istae actiones perpetuae heredibus dantur et in 
heredes ut [D.19.2.19.836].37 
However, these actions are perpetual and given against heirs 
and to the beneﬁt of heirs as in [D.19.2.19.8]. 
Like Goffredus de Trano, Azo contrasted C.4.65.10 with a text on 
usufruct (C.3.33.10) and resolved the apparent conﬂict between 
them in a similar fashion.  Azo also mentioned that it need not be 
explicitly stated in the contract of letting and hiring that both the 
parties and their heirs are bound under the contract.  Where it 
had been stipulated that the contract only endures as long as the 
locator wishes, that is a tenancy-at-will, it was terminated by his 
death.  Finally, in his summa on the Code, Azo mentioned that 
letting and hiring was normally not terminated by death unless 
stipulated as such.  The signiﬁcance of Azo’s treatment of the 
issue is threefold.  First, he introduced a new element to the 
discussion by enquiring whether the statement about the 
hereditability needed to be recorded in writing in the contract of 
letting and hiring.  Secondly, the circumstances of a tenancy-at-
will were also added to the discussion.  Finally, a comparison was 
                                                                                               
34  As in note 32. 
35 Azo,  Summa super Codicem, in M. Viora, ed., Corpus Glossatorum 
Iuris Civilis, 2 (Turin 1966), 170, right-hand column towards the top.  
36 D.19.2.19.8,  Ulpian,  Edict, book 32: “It is obvious that an action on 
hire passes to the [lessee’s] heir.” 
37  Azo (note 35), 173 in medio. 2008  The Creation of Legal Principle  59
 
drawn with feudal tenants, thus indicating an attempt to draw 
parallels with other areas of law and possibly with legal practice. 
  Odofredus de Denariis (ﬂ. until c. 1265), a student of Azo, 
raised similar questions in his analysis of C.4.65.10.38  
[Viam] In lege ista dicitur quod heres conductoris succedit in 
conductione, sicut heres locatoris in locatione et qui aliter 
credunt viam veritatis ignorat.  Textus viam veritatis ignor-
ant dicit Imperator interroganti ut patet ex legis subscrip-
tione.  Textus in conductione f[ecit] proprietatis secus in 
conductionibus usufructis.  Et sic solvetur contra.  Unomodo 
supra [C.3.33.1039].  Textus enim sive perpetua conductio est 
infra usque ad xxx annos quod et actiones dicuntur perpe-
tuae, quae durant usque ad xxx annos ut [J.4.1240].  Vel 
potest dici, cum sive perpetua conductio est, id est quamdiu 
solvatur pensio et sic sumitur [J.3.24.341].  Vel potest dici, 
cum sive perpetua conductio est f[ecit] usque ad vitam et tunc 
non transiret usque ad heredes.42  
In this lex it states that the heir of the conductor succeeds in 
the tenancy just as the heir of the locator succeeds in letting 
and hiring and it states that he who believes differently ig-
                                                                                               
38 See the entry on Odofredus by Coing (note 7), 181, and Lange 
(note 2), § 39. 
39  As in note 27. 
40 A generic reference to the entire title.  It will therefore not be 
cited. 
41 J.3.24.3: 
The relationship between hire and sale is so close that on some facts 
it has been difficult to say which of the two contracts is made.  Take, 
for example, the case where land is transferred to be enjoyed in per-
petuity.  That is to say, the agreement is that if the owner receives 
his rent or other return he will always be barred from disturbing not 
only the tenant and his heir but also any assignee from them, 
whether the alienation arises from sale, gift, dowry or any other rea-
son.  Doubts about this contract, with some of the classical jurists 
coming down for hire and others for sale, led the Emperor Zeno to es-
tablish its independence under the name of emphyteusis.  It no 
longer leans towards sale or hire, but stands apart, with its own im-
plied terms.  Zeno’s enactment also provided for express terms to be 
given effect, as in other contracts recognized by the law of nature.  It 
also ruled that in the absence of an express provision as to risk the 
owner bears the risk of total destruction, while partial loss is borne 
by the emphyteutic tenant. 
42 Odofredus,  Lectura super Codice, in D. Maffei, E. Cortese and G. 
Rossi, ed., Opera Iuridica Rariora, 5 (Bologna 1968–1969) (anastatic 
reprint of a Lyons 1552 edition), on C.4.65.10. 60  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 4
 
nores the truth.  The text “viam veritatis ignorant” states 
“Imperator interroganti” which is clear from the subscript of 
the lex.  The text was concerned with the hiring of property, 
the matter is different in the letting and hiring of a usufruct.  
The contradictory [text] is resolved in this way.  In one way 
above [C.3.33.10].  The text states “whether the letting and 
hiring is perpetual” [that is] is for a period of thirty years and 
the actions are called perpetual, which last for thirty years as 
in [J.4.12].  Or it could be said that “whether the letting and 
hiring is perpetual,” [that is] as long as the rent is paid and it 
is interpreted in this way [J.3.24.3].  Or it could be said that 
“whether a letting and hiring is perpetual” [that is] it endures 
for life and then it does not transfer to the heirs. 
Odofredus’ analysis, following an initial discussion of the differ-
ence between letting and hiring and usufruct, focused on the 
circumstances in which letting and hiring could be said to be 
perpetual.  Although this is essentially a philological analysis of 
the text, the three possibilities mentioned in light of statements 
made in various Roman law texts indicate that Odofredus at-
tempted to deﬁne this term using a variety of different legal texts.  
It is also worth mentioning that Odofredus’ treatment of this 
latter point resembles that of Azo. 
  The combined Glossatorial interpretation of the issue of the 
hereditability of letting and hiring was laid out in the Gloss of 
Accursius (d. 1263), a student of Azo at Bologna.43 
[Viam veritatis] Est ergo veritas quod succedit ut hic subiicit 
et [D.19.2.60.144 et D.19.2.19.845 et C.5.12.18,46 J.3.24.647 et 
                                                                                               
43  On Accursius, see the entry by Coing (note 7), 173–75.  
44 D.19.2.60.1,  Labeo,  Posthumous Works, Epitomized by Javolenus, 
book 5: “I think that a tenant farmer’s heir, though not himself a tenant 
farmer, nonetheless possesses for the owner.” 
45  See note 36. 
46 C.5.12.18: 
The Emperors Diocletian and Maximian to Menestratus.  If your 
mother-in-law donated a tract of land to your wife with the reserva-
tion of the usufruct, and your wife gave the ownership of said prop-
erty to you by way of dowry, and then your mother-in-law transferred 
to you the usufruct of the same, there is no doubt that the land will 
remain in your hands in accordance with the terms of the agreement 
entered into between you if your wife should die during the marriage.  
If, however, your mother-in-law gave her daughter the usufruct in 
consideration of receiving a certain sum of money annually, and the 
latter should die, at least the usufruct could [not (cf. Blume)] be ex-
tinguished.  294 CE.  2008  The Creation of Legal Principle  61
 
J.2.1.3648] in eo quod enim ibi fere.  Sed contra supra 
[C.3.33.1049].  Solve ut ibi.50 
It is therefore the truth that it succeeds as introduced here 
and [D.19.2.60.1, D.19.2.19.9, C.5.12.18, J.3.24.6, J.2.1.36] in 
eo quod enim ibi fere.  But [see] contrary above on usufruct 
[C.3.33.10].  It is solved as [indicated] there. 
At  ﬁrst sight, Accursius’ treatment of the matter seems unre-
markable, but a closer inspection of the texts cited in support of 
his interpretation reveals interesting information.  Thus, for 
example, D.19.2.60.1 is concerned with the issue of possession and 
whether the heir of an agricultural tenant continues to possess 
the property on behalf of its owner like the deceased tenant.   
Similarly, C.5.12.18 and J.2.1.36 deal with the letting out of a 
usufruct.  The large number of supporting texts, combined with 
the breadth of coverage obtained from a collective reading of 
these, indicates that Accursius explored the potential application 
of this principle in the broadest possible sense. 
c.  Phase three 
Jacques de Revigny (ﬂ. until the second half of the thirteenth 
century), one of the prominent French jurists of the “school” of 
Orleans, examined the casus mentioned in C.4.65.24.51 
[Contractus] Si ergo licet uxor habitaverit cum marito[,] 
tamen non convenietur domus immo maritus nisi conduxerit 
post mortem domum.  Unde non dico quod si mulier habita-
verit mortuo marito quod possit conveniri immo convenientur 
heredes mariti qui poterunt habitare ut supra [C.4.65.1052].  
Nec dicerem quod mulier videretur tacite reconduxisse.  Nam 
                                                                                               
47  J.3.24.6: “If someone who has something on hire dies before the 
period of the hire expires, his heir steps into his shoes with the same 
rights.” 
48  J.2.1.36: “A usufructuary becomes owner of the fruits of the land 
only by harvesting them himself.  If he dies when the fruit is ready but 
unpicked, his heir is not entitled to it.  It goes to the landowner.  Much the 
same rules apply for tenants.” 
49  As in note 27. 
50 Accursius,  Glossa in Codicem, in M. Viora, ed., Corpus Glossator-
um Iuris Civilis, 10 (Turin 1968), on C.4.65.24. 
51  On Jacques de Revigny, see Coing (note 7), 281–82. 
52  As above in the survey of Roman law texts. 62  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 4
 
illud ego intelligo in eadem persona.53 
Thus, even though a wife inhabited [the rented property] with 
her husband, she will not have concluded a contract for the 
house, more correctly the husband [has], unless she rented 
the house after his death.  Thus I cannot say that if the wife 
inhabited after the death of her husband, she is able to con-
clude a contract, more correctly the heirs of the husband, who 
are permitted to inhabit as [C.4.65.10], [are able to conclude a 
contract].  Nor would I say that the wife is deemed to have re-
rented the property tacitly for I understand this [to apply] to 
the same person. 
The signiﬁcance of de Revigny’s commentary on this text is 
twofold.  First, this text is not frequently discussed in the context 
of this debate.  Most jurists focused on C.4.65.10 and Jacques de 
Revigny’s choice to comment on this text rather than the conven-
tional sedes materiae is some indication of his method.  As the text 
shows, Jacques de Revigny generally did not use legal authority to 
the same extent as, for example, Accursius.  Instead, he argued 
the legal point in this text logically (using the idea of tacit intent) 
without relying on extensive authority using Roman law texts. 
 Since  the  ius commune consisted of a number of different 
strands of legal thought, it is important to establish whether 
canonist thought on this subject deviated from civilian thought 
during this period.  An inﬂuential canonist of this period, Henri-
cus Hostiensis (d. 1271) held a similar view to that of his civilian 
counterparts.54  
§ 8 Et quales sint perpetuae heredibus dantur et in heredes 
[D.19.2.19.855].56 
And these [actions] are perpetual and are granted to heirs 
and against heirs [D.19.2.19.8]. 
Unlike the statement by Goffredus de Trano, however, Hostiensis’ 
comment on the issue seems to reﬂect the early discussions which 
focused on the transmissibility of actions rather than the more 
                                                                                               
53 Jacques  de  Revigny,  Lectura super Codice, in D. Maffei, E. Cortese 
and G. Rossi, ed., Opera Iuridica Rariora, 1 (Bologna 1967) (anastatic 
reprint of a Paris 1519 edition), on C.4.65.24. 
54  On Henricus de Segusio (Cardinal Hostiensis), see Coing (note 7), 
378. 
55  As in note 36. 
56  Henricus de Segusio [Cardinal Hostiensis], Summa Aurea (Padua 
1548), bk. 3, de locato et conducto, § 8.  2008  The Creation of Legal Principle  63
 
recent discussions which took other areas of law into considera-
tion. 
  As for civilian scholarship, Cynus de Pistoia (ﬂ. until 
1327/36), teacher of Bartolus de Saxoferrato, gave an in-depth 
analysis of C.4.65.10.  
[Viam] Not[andum] quod qui contrarium iuris sentit, viam 
veritatis ignorat.  Secundo not[andum] quod conductor 
tempus conductionis transmittit ad heredem.  Ad legem istam 
oppositio supra de [C.3.33.1057].  Sed solve ut ibi.  Quaero 
circa legem istam.  Scholares conducunt hospitium, & divi-
dunt cameras: vel unus conduxit principaliter, et & alius locat 
cameras.  Recedit unus, vel moritur, nunquid alium possit 
substituere, vel nunquid heres eius possit ibi stare?  Videtur 
quod sic, ut hic.  Adverte in persona scholaris, quod duo 
concurrunt, contractus locationis et conductionis, & contrac-
tus societatis: si nos respiciamus primum, de natura eius est, 
ut possit alius surrogari.  Si nos respiciamus secundum, tunc 
oportet subdistinguere: aut eligitur industria personae, & 
tunc non posset alius surrogari: aut non eligitur personae 
industria, ut accidit in quibusdam, qui tanquam extranei 
morantur, sicut grammates, & laici: et tunc potest ﬁeri 
surrogatio.58 
It should be noted that he who declares the contrary legal po-
sition ignores the path of truth.  Secondly it needs to be noted 
that the tenant transfers the period of the contract to the 
heir.  An opposition to this lex exists above [C.3.33.10], but it 
is resolved as [indicated] there.  I pose the following question 
concerning that law.  Students rent a house and divide the 
rooms, or one rents as the principal and sublets the rooms.  If 
one were to withdraw, or die, can he substitute another, or is 
it possible for his heir to stay there?  It seems that it is so, as 
in this case.  Notice that two [contracts] run together in the 
person of the student, that is the contract of letting and hir-
ing and of partnership.  If we were to take notice of the one, 
its nature is that he is permitted to substitute another.  If we 
were to take note of another, then a distinction should be 
drawn: if the industry of the person was [speciﬁcally] se-
lected, then it is not possible to substitute another.  If the in-
                                                                                               
57  As in note 27. 
58 G. Polara, ed., Cyni Pistoriensis Lectura super Codice, 1 (Rome 
1998) (anastatic reprint of a 1578 Frankfurt am Main edition), on 
C.4.65.10. 64  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 4
 
dustry of the person was not selected, which happens in some 
cases which concern foreigners as in the cases of scholars and  
laymen; then a substitution is possible. 
The importance of this account lies in Cynus’ inclusion of an 
interesting practical question.  Where a number of students rent 
accommodation collectively and one of them dies, is a substitution 
of a co-tenant possible?  The question depends on whether the 
property was let collectively to a partnership of students or 
individually.  If the property was let under the former contract, 
then a delectus personae existed and a substitution was said to be 
impossible.  If it was done under the latter, then a substitution 
was possible.  A similar discussion may be found in his comment 
on C.4.65.24. 
[Contractus] Haec lex ponit duos casus: et circa primum sic 
procedit, quia primo loquitur in genere.  Secundo infert ad 
speciem.  Secundus casus est planus qui incipit ibi sane, et 
cetera.  Nota ex lege ista, quod ex contractu locationis factae 
a marito non convenitur uxor.  Sed si uxor ipsa conducat, tunc 
pro illo tempore convenitur ad mercedem.  Et hoc verum 
quando conduxit expresse, nam quod dicitur de tacita conduc-
tione, locum habet in eadem persona, quae prius conduxit.   
Sic intelligitur supra [C.4.65.1659 & l.ista60].61 
This  lex poses two cases and the ﬁrst one should be ap-
proached in this manner, since in the ﬁrst it speaks in gen-
eral.  In the second it refers to a speciﬁc case.  The second 
case is self-evident where it begins “ibi sane” etc.  Note from 
that lex that a contract of letting and hiring made by a hus-
band does not bind his wife.  But if the wife rented in her own 
name, then she has contracted for the payment of rent for 
that period.  And this is the true position when she has 
rented expressly, because what is stated about tacit letting 
ﬁnds application in the same person who let originally.  It is 
                                                                                               
59 C.4.65.16: 
The Emperors Valerian and Gallienus, and the Caesar Valerian to 
Aurelius Timotheus.  The provisions of a lease must be observed, and 
no more than was agreed upon can be demanded as rent.  If, however, 
the term for which the land was leased expired, and the lessee re-
mains in possession, it is considered that the lease and the obligation 
of pledge are both renewed by tacit consent. 
60  This citation could not be resolved.  There is no l.ista in the Codex 
title on letting and hiring. 
61  As in note 58. 2008  The Creation of Legal Principle  65
 
interpreted in this manner above [C.4.65.16 & (spurious ref-
erence)]. 
Cynus’ view on the hereditability of letting and hiring reﬂects 
wider civilian opinion on the matter. Thus, according to Albericus 
de Rosate (ﬂ. until 1354/60) on C.4.65.10, the heirs of the tenant 
succeed him. 
[Viam veritatis] Qui contrarium iuri sentit, viam veritatis 
ignorat, & heres conductoris in conductione succedit.  Hoc 
dicit.  Idem in re ecclesiastica, usque ad tertiam generatio-
nem, ut in [N.7.362].63 
He who believes the alternative legal position, ignores the 
way of truth and the heir of the tenant succeeds in the ten-
ancy. This is what it says. The same applies in ecclesiastical 
objects, until the third generation, as in [N.7.3]. 
It is interesting to note that the same rules apply to objects rented 
out under ecclesiastical law until the third generation.  This is 
supported by way of a text from the Novels on emphyteusis. 
  Bartolus de Saxoferrato (ﬂ. until 1357) made scant reference 
to the issue of the hereditability of letting and hiring without 
contributing anything signiﬁcant to the discussion.64  His pupil, 
Baldus de Ubaldis (ﬂ. until 1400), on the other hand, raised an 
interesting question in his discussion of C.4.65.10.65  
Heres obligatur ex locatione et conductione defuncti, tam 
perpetua quam temporali hoc dicit et adde [C.4.65.566 in 
quaestio 3 et insuper C.3.33.667].  Ratio dubitandi erat, quia 
                                                                                               
62  This reference is spurious. 
63 Albericus  de  Rosate,  Commentarii in Primam Codicis Partem, in 
D. Maffei, E. Cortese and G. Rossi, ed., Opera Iuridica Rariora, 27 (Bolo-
gna 1979) (anastatic reprint of a Venice 1586 edition), on C.4.65.10. 
64  Bartolus de Saxoferrato, Commentaria super Primam Digesti Vet-
eris Partem (Lyons 1549), on D.19.2.15.9.  
65  On Baldus, see the entry by P. Weimar, in: Lexikon des Mittelal-
ters, 1 (Munich 1980), cols. 1375–76. 
66 C.4.65.5: 
The Emperor Alexander to Aurelius Petronius.  It is a certain rule of 
law that property which tenants, with the consent of the owners, 
have brought onto the leased land, will be liable by the right of pledge 
to the owners of said land.  When, however, a house is leased, it is not 
necessary for the owner to know that articles have been brought into 
it, in order to subject them to the right of pledge.  223 CE. 
67 C.3.33.6: 66  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 4
 
colonus adstringendo se in perpetuum obligat se ad 
quamquam ﬁnitatem: ergo non tenetur heres. . . .  
The heir is obliged by virtue of the letting and hiring of the 
deceased, whether perpetual or for a ﬁxed period of time.   
This is what the text states and add [C.4.65.5 question 3 and 
furthermore C.3.33.6].  A matter of doubt existed whether a 
tenant of agricultural land who has bound himself perpetu-
ally is obliged to a certain limit/boundary: thus the heir is not 
obliged. . . . 
If a tenant of agricultural land (colonus) bound himself to the land 
in perpetuity, would his heirs be bound to the same fate as well?  
According to Baldus’ reasoning, an obligation of this nature had a 
speciﬁc limit, namely the life of the original tenant.  Thus, his 
heirs would not be burdened with it.  As for the case at the basis 
of C.4.65.24, he mentioned that the wife of a deceased conductor 
was not bound by the letting and hiring entered into by her 
husband. 
[Contractus] Ex conductione mariti non tenetur uxor: sed si 
ipsa conduxit, tenetur, hoc dicit.  Tacite tamen non videtur 
reconducere, licet remaneat in eadem habitatione in qua 
maritus habitaverit secundum Cynum.  Ofﬁcio tamen iudicis 
tenebitur solvere competentem mercedem pro tempore, quo 
ipsa habitaverit post mortem viri, nisi habitavisset cum 
heredibus viri iure familiaritatis.  Facit quod notandum 
Cynum infra [C.4.65.32 pr.68] ubi dicit, quod pensiones debent 
taxari per iudicem.69 
                                                                                               
The Emperor Alexander to Stratonica.  It makes a difference whether 
your husband received only the usufruct by way of dowry, or whether 
the ownership was given as dowry, and a contract was entered into 
that at his death possession would be restored to you.  For a usufruc-
tuary cannot pledge property.  He, however, who has received land as 
an appraised dowry, is not, for that reason, prevented from encum-
bering it, since, if the marriage should be dissolved, the appraised 
value must be repaid to you.  230 CE. 
68  This text is not directly relevant as the author comments on an-
other jurist’s analysis on this text, but for the sake of clarity it will be 
cited.  C.4.65.32 pr.: 
The Emperor Zeno to Adamantius, Praetorian Prefect.  No one who 
has rented a house, a shop, or a farm shall, after his lease has ex-
pired, be permitted to bring suit against a person who has leased the 
property on the same terms, with the consent of its owner, on the 
ground that the lease is unlawful, or attempt to injure him thereby, 2008  The Creation of Legal Principle  67
 
The wife is not bound by virtue of the letting and hiring made 
by the husband, but if she rented in her own name, she is 
bound.  This is what the text states.  She does not seem to 
have re-rented tacitly, however, even though she is permitted 
to remain in the same property in which her husband lived 
according to Cynus [de Pistoia].  But he shall be bound 
through the office of the judge to pay an appropriate amount 
of rent for that period during which she inhabited the dwell-
ing following the death of her husband, unless she had in-
habited the house with the heirs of the husband by virtue of 
the ius familiaritatis.  Attention should also be paid to Cynus 
below [C.4.65.32 pr.] where he states that rents ought to be 
assessed by a judge. 
The signiﬁcance of Baldus’ examination of this text is twofold.   
First, Baldus attributed this interpretation (rightly) to Cynus de 
Pistoia.  This suggests the growth of doctrine, since the earlier 
jurists’ interpretations of this legal point were now regarded as 
settled doctrine and were cited as authority instead of referring 
back to the original Roman law texts.  Furthermore, in an addi-
tional comment on local practice, Baldus mentioned that it was 
the task of the judge to assess the amount of rent that the wife of 
the deceased tenant will have to pay in return for remaining on 
the property, unless she inhabited the property together with the 
male heirs of the tenant on the grounds of the ius familiaritatis70 
in which case she could presumably remain there rent free. 
4.  Conclusions 
This examination of the way in which the notion of the heredit-
ability of letting and hiring took root in civilian systems has shed 
                                                                                               
but every facility shall be afforded the owners of property to lease 
their houses, their lands, or their shops to anyone they wish, and 
those who have leased them shall, by all means, be protected from 
any annoyance of this kind; unless contracts especially entered into 
in writing with the owners, or with those who afterwards leased the 
property, and which were drawn up according to law, should justify 
them in instituting proceedings.  [Undated.] 
69  Baldus de Ubaldis, In IIII et V librum Codicis Commentaria (Ven-
ice 1606), on C.4.65.24. 
70 This little-known concept seems to have existed in Roman law.   
Compare D.41.2.41, where it is noted that someone who enters the land of 
a friend (amicus) on account of the ius familiaritatis is not deemed to 
possess, since he does not have the animus to possess even though he may 
be physically present on the land.  D.50.16.223 deﬁnes a friend (amicus) as 
more than a mere acquaintance. 68  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 4
 
new light on the formation of the ius commune.  Three phases 
may be identiﬁed.  In the ﬁrst phase, medieval academic discus-
sions focused mainly on the transmissibility of actions without 
much critical examination.  Although there is some evidence of 
synthesis, neither the scope nor the application of the principle 
was at the forefront of any academic discussions.  The second 
phase witnesses the evolution of a general principle.  This oc-
curred in a number of ways.  The notion of the hereditability of 
letting and hiring was initially contrasted to other potentially 
conﬂicting passages in the Corpus Iuris Civilis.  A discussion of a 
seemingly contradictory text about the renting out of a usufruct 
became a stock feature in the works of many medieval jurists.   
This indicates a higher level of understanding as the jurists began 
to consider the features of different legal institutions (letting and 
hiring v. usufruct) in an attempt to iron out the contradiction.   
The contradiction was ﬁnally resolved by a comprehensive state-
ment about the nature of usufruct as a personal servitude which 
terminated upon the death of the holder.  A process of integration 
is also visible in juristic discussions forming part of phase two.  
Thus, variations in local custom or ecclesiastical law were exam-
ined to test the scope and function of the developing general 
principle.  The ﬁnal phase in the development of this general 
principle was dominated by the practical application of this 
principle.  All of the potential conﬂicts had by now been resolved 
(indeed there is evidence that jurists now cite earlier jurists 
rather than the original Roman law texts) and the jurists were 
more concerned with application. 
  It is important to note that these phases are not linear, nor is 
the development of one predicated upon the existence of another.  
What they demonstrate, however, is that the medieval jurists 
used a number of sophisticated cognitive techniques to develop 
principles of law from Roman legal texts.  These were tested 
against other areas of law to establish their scope and implication. 
  The issues not addressed in the formulation of the principle 
also speak volumes.  First, medieval interpretations of the issue of 
the hereditability of letting and hiring do not focus on the concept 
of the legal obligation.  None of the texts justify the hereditability 
of letting and hiring in terms of the transmissibility of obligations.  
This would suggest that intellectual discussions of the concept of 
obligations had not yet come to the forefront as in subsequent 
periods of the ius commune.  Secondly the issue of the heredit-
ability of the contract of letting and hiring also seems to have 
remained unconnected to the debate about the forms types of 2008  The Creation of Legal Principle  69
 
letting and hiring.  This suggests that the classiﬁcation of the law 
of letting and hiring into a trichotomy did not occur until later. 
 